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   1 
During the 1990s, demand for organic products increased on average by 20% each year.  
This growth in demand fueled growth in organic crop acreage.  Between 1992 and 2005, 
organic cropland more than quadrupled, going from 403,400 acres to just over 1.7 million 
acres (USDA, 2008).  Demand is predicted to increase annually by an additional 9 to 
16% through 2010 (Dimitri and Oberholtzer, 2005).  This further increase in demand will 
lead to an additional expansion of organic acreage,  increasing  the heterogeneity of 
agricultural regions and increasing the interaction that occurs between conventional and 
organic farms as they more frequently share the same regional landscape.  Sharing the 
same landscape implies that they share  pest and natural enemy populations.  The 
movement of these organisms links farms within a region, potentially  causing one 
grower’s pest control decisions to impact other growers.  This paper examines these 
interactions. 
The analysis focuses on one organic and one conventional profit-maximizing 
grower.  One pest and one natural enemy population connect the time periods in the 
model, and the movement of these populations connects the grower’s fields, creating a 
spatial-dynamic model.  The  analysis compares the privately optimal levels of pest 
control on the neighboring farms with the socially optimal levels of pest control.  This 
comparison will illuminate situations when private decisions lower the region’s total 
profits via negative externalities  created by the movement of insects.  The model 
examines how these externalities differ under different population dynamics. 
 
   2 
Background on Pest Control 
Pest control is an important part of agricultural production.  Crop production systems 
include the host crop, one or more pests that damage or eat the crop, and one or more 
predators or parasitoids that eat or lay eggs in, respectively, the pest population(s).  These 
predators and parasitoids,  known as natural enemies,  provide a natural form of pest 
control.  Growers can introduce other pest control agents, such as pesticides, into the crop 
production system.  When the cost of controlling the pest is less than the revenue lost due 
to damage, growers maximize profit by choosing the type and level of pest control.  The 
type of pest control chosen in part depends on the type of grower.  Conventional growers 
have the widest range of pest control options available to them while organic regulations 
restrict organic growers to a subset of the options available to conventional growers.  The 
toxicity of these options to natural enemies falls along a spectrum, ranging from highly 
toxic to non-toxic. 
Synthetic broad spectrum pesticides fall on the highly toxic end of the spectrum.  
These pesticides are not species-specific, so any individual broad spectrum pesticide is 
capable of killing multiple pest species and may have lethal and sub-lethal effects on 
natural enemies.
1  Some approved organic pesticides, such as neem oil and spinosad, may 
fall next on the spectrum.  In laboratory studies, these pesticides have negative impacts 
on natural enemies, but  no evidence of pest  resurgences due to lowered enemy 
populations following the applications has been reported on organic farms (Johnson and 
Krugner, 2004).  This suggests that these organic pesticides are either less toxic to natural   3 
enemies than synthetic broad spectrum pesticides or natural enemies are able to withstand 
the chemicals on organic farms, given the other resources available to them. 
Insect pathogens, such as Bacillus thuringiensis, have some lethal and sublethal 
effects on natural enemies, but less than many synthetic broad spectrum pesticides, neem 
oil, and spinosad (Johnson and Krugner, 2004).  Insect growth regulators target specific 
hormones and interfere with the insect’s development, preventing the individual from 
becoming a reproductive adult.  Each regulator is specific to a group of insects that 
contain the same hormone (Cornell University Cooperation Extension, 2001), so these 
will not kill natural enemies as long as the enemies do not contain the targeted hormone.   
Pheromones  have little toxicity to natural enemies  because each pheromone 
targets only one species of pest.  Farmers use these naturally produced chemicals to 
attract pests into traps or to interfere with mating (Cornell  University  Cooperative 
Extension, 2001).  Similarly, natural repellants such as herbal teas, plant extracts, and 
clay or rock powder repel pests with little to no impact on natural enemies (Zehnder et 
al., 2007).    
Not surprisingly, the use of natural enemies also falls at the low toxicity end of 
the spectrum.  Through the provision of habitat, pollen, and nectar, growers can attract 
natural enemies to their fields and help establish populations large enough to keep pest 
populations under control.  Growers may also provide food for existing populations of 
predators or hosts for parasitoids when pest populations are low, in order to keep the 
natural enemies available to help with new pest population booms (Zehnder et al., 2007).  
If he or she cannot attract adequate quantities of natural enemies, the grower can import   4 
predators and parasitoids to release in the fields, a practice that farmers repeat as often as 
once a week during the growing season, depending on the crop and natural enemy 
involved (Zehnder et al., 2007). 
In addition to the chemical and biological control methods discussed, growers can 
use cultural controls such as the timing of planting or harvesting, mulching, and planting 
trap crops.  All of these practices have limited impact on natural enemies as well. 
Conventional California fruit and nut growers most commonly apply synthetic 
broad spectrum pesticides, such as organophosphates, carbamates, and,  increasingly, 
pyrethroids (Zalom, Toscano, and Byrne,  2005), despite their high toxicity to natural 
enemies.  Insect growth regulators and pheromones tend to be more expensive than broad 
spectrum pesticides due to high development and production costs and are most effective 
at controlling low to moderate pest outbreaks (Welter et al., 2005).  Cost analyses 
performed for  strawberry and cabbage show that for these  crops,  the use of natural 
enemies can cost thousands of dollars more per acre than conventional pest management 
involving broad spectrum pesticides (Lundgren, Heimpel, and Bomgren, 2002; Trumble 
and Morse, 1993).  Thus, we find that the use of broad spectrum pesticides is more 
widespread than the use of more targeted methods  among conventional fruit and nut 
growers. 
In contrast, certified organic farms cannot use synthetic broad spectrum 
pesticides, and must rely on other methods.  The use of natural enemies, when viable, can 
be a low cost alternative to organic pesticides (Zehnder et al., 2007).  While the use of 
locally available natural enemies is a potentially inexpensive and environmentally sound   5 
form of pest control  relative to other organic methods, conventional pesticide use in 
nearby fields can make the use of natural enemies more challenging.  In the case of citrus 
crops, vedalia beetles provide excellent control of the cotton cushiony scale, a major pest 
(University of California Cooperative Extension, 2003), but some organic growers have a 
difficult time keeping vedalia beetle populations on their farms when located near 
conventional farms.  This problem is exacerbated by the fact that these beetles are not 
available commercially, so growers cannot augment natural populations with purchased 
beetles (R. Whitehurst, personal communication, July 1, 2008).  According to a supplier 
of commercially available natural enemies,  organic farmers, growing various crops, 
complain of reductions in, and in some cases complete elimination of, natural enemy 
populations from conventional pesticide applications on neighboring farms (M. Cherim, 
personal communication, July 1, 2008).   
Previous Work 
To date, little work has been done to examine the impact of different pest management 
systems on each other.  There is a limited literature that analyzes pest management in an 
explicitly spatial context.  These models have included multiple farms contained within 
the same landscape.  Levins (1969) examines the optimal timing of pest control among 
homogeneous farms located in the same region.  He finds that synchronized control 
yields the lowest proportion of infested farms.  Ives and Settle (1997) also look at optimal 
pest control among homogenous farms in the same region.  However, they include 
predators of the pest in their model, look at the levels of the local populations, and 
consider timing of planting among otherwise homogenous farms.  They find that   6 
asynchronous planting among growers can yield lower pest levels because such a 
planting distribution keeps sizable local pest populations present in the region for a 
longer period of time, which in turn keeps local predator populations high.  
Kean et al. (2003) consider only biological control in a 7 by 7 grid of farms.  The 
central farm actively supports natural enemies on its land, while the other farms only 
passively allow biological control to occur.  They find that the natural enemy population 
increases on the central farm, while its pest population decreases.  On farms directly 
neighboring the central farm, local enemy populations decrease, and local  pest 
populations increase.  However, the total system’s pest population is lower when the 
central farm encourages enemies to stay on its land than in the case where no farm 
encourages natural enemies. 
Finally, Sherratt and Jepson (1993) use a spatial model to examine the effects of 
toxicity of pesticides to both the pest and predators of the pest.  They find that as the 
toxicity of the pesticide to the predator increases relative to its toxicity to the pest, the 
probably of a pest resurgence following the pesticide application increases. 
The literature discussed above considers the population dynamics involved when 
pests and natural enemies move between farms within the same region.  In these models, 
growers are either assumed to work together cooperatively or to  follow a given pest 
management plan.  The model presented here builds on these models by adding a profit-
maximization problem to the population dynamics, allowing growers to choose their level 
of pest control, given the levels of pests and enemies faced.   
   7 
Model: Economic Basics 
This model involves two neighboring fields: one organic field and one conventional field.  
Organic  is  denoted by an “o” superscript and conventional denoted by a “c” 
superscript, {,} i co ∈ .  Time is indicated by t.  One pest,  t N , and one natural enemy of 
the pest,  t P , move between the two fields.  In the absence of the pest, grower i could 
achieve a potential output of 
i y , assuming that pest control decisions are separable from 
all other grower decisions with regards to output.  A portion of the output,  ()
i
t DN , will 
be damaged by the pest population on field i, and each grower makes use of one pesticide 
and the natural enemy to control the local pest population.
2  Grower i chooses the level of 
pesticide, 
i
t X , which is sold a at a price 
i w  in order to maximize profit.  This level of pest 
control results in  ()
ii
t hX pests being killed.  The pest control provided by the natural 
enemy enters into the problem through the population dynamics discussed below.  Each 
grower’s profit for period t  equals  (1 ( ))
ii i i i
tt py DN wX −− .  The grower’s profit 
maximizing pesticide application choice will depend on the population dynamics of the 
pest and natural enemy.  
Model: Population Basics 
The population dynamics connect the farms through time and space.  The pest population 
on field i grows through reproduction, ()
ii i
tt Nr N  where  ()
ii
t rNis the per capita growth 
rate, and through the dispersal of pests from field  j to field i,  (, )
ji i j
Ntt d NN.  This dispersal 
depends on the relative levels of pests on each farm.  Field i’s pest population declines   8 
due to predation or parasitism,  (,)
i ii
t tt P NP φ  where  (,)
ii
tt NP φ is the number of pests killed 
per enemy per time period, the dispersal of pests from the field i to field j,   (, )
ij i j
Ntt d NN , 
and pest control,   ()
ii
t hX .  The change in the pest population on field i  can thus be 
written as: 
(1)  () (,) () (, ) (, )
i
i i i i i i i i ij i j ji i j t
t t t t t t Ntt Ntt
N




= − −− +
∂
 
  The natural enemy population on field i  increases through reproduction, 
[ (,) ,]
i ii i
t tt t Pf N P P φ  where  [ (,) ,]
ii i
tt t f NP P φ  is the per capita reproduction rate.  This rate 
depends on both its consumption or parasitism of the  pest,  (,)
ii
tt NP φ , and the enemy 
population.  It can also increase through dispersal from field j to field i,  (, )
ji i j
Ptt d NN.  It 
diminishes through the  dispersal  of enemies from field  i  to field j,  (, )
ij i j
Ptt dNN   and, 
through deaths resulting from the use of pesticides,  ()
ii
t bX.  This model assumes that the 
organic pesticide is non-toxic to enemies,  ( ) 0 
oo o
tt bX X = ∀ , while the conventional 
pesticide is toxic to natural enemies,  ( )0
cc












.  This model also 
assumes that predators or parasitoids move from areas of low pest density to areas of high 
pest density.  The change in enemy population on field i can thus be written as: 
(2)  [ (,) ,] () (, ) (, )
i
i i i i i i ij i j ji i j t
t t t t t Ptt Ptt
P







In the discussion of the results that follows, the “appreciation rates” of the pest 
and natural enemies are important.  The enemy appreciation rate on field i includes the   9 
number of offspring produced by an additional enemy per period and the effects of an 
additional enemy on the reproduction rate of the enemy population as a whole.  In the 
privately optimal case, the pest appreciation rate on field i  includes the number of 
offspring produced by an additional pest per period, the net movement of pests to field i 
induced by an additional pest, and the change in predation or parasitism that occurs by 
the movement of enemies to field i induced by an additional pest.  In the socially optimal 
case, field i’s pest appreciation rate will also include changes in the pest population that 
occur on field j due to an additional pest on field i.  In all cases, the appreciation rate is 
essentially the contribution of one insect to the next time period’s population. 
Private Profit Maximizing, Non-Cooperative Equilibrium 
Under  the  assumption of  private, non-cooperative  profit maximization,  both the 
conventional and organic growers choose a level of pest control to maximize their own 
profit, without considering the impacts of the decision on the neighboring farm.  Growers 
know the population dynamics and take the other grower’s decision as given.  Grower i’s 
profit maximization problem is: 
(3) 
0
max [ (1 ( )) ]
i
t




p y D N w X dt
∞
=
−− ∫  
subject to: 
(4)  () (,) () (, ) (, )
i
i i i i i i i i ij i j ji i j t
t t t t t t Ntt Ntt
N




= − −− +
∂
 
(5)  [ (,) ,]() (, ) (, )
i
i i i i i ij i j ji i j t
t t t t t Ptt Ptt
P
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The present valued Hamiltonian is: 
(6)  (1 ( ))
ii i i i
tt H py DN wX = −−  
[ () (,) () (, ) (, ) ]
[ [ (,) ,]() (, ) (, ) ]
i i i i i i i i i ij i j ji i j
N t t t t t t t Ntt Ntt
i i i i i i ij i j ji i j
P t t t t t t Ptt Ptt
N rN P NP hX d NN d NN
P f NP P b X dNN d NN
λφ
λφ
+ − −− +
+ −− +
. 
To ensure a solution exists, we assume that all functions are continuously differentiable 
functions of time.  In order to ensure that the Hamiltonian is jointly concave in the state 































































































































3  None of these assumptions are unrealistic, nor should they drive 
the results. 













Pt P G λ +
ii
Pt Pt rλλ = −   
where  
[ (,) ,] (,) [ (,) ,]
[ (,) ,] ( )
(,)
ii i ii ii i
i ii i i tt t tt tt t
P tt t t ii i i
tt t t
f NP P NP f NP P








: This is the 
change in the growth of the enemy population on field i in time t, excluding dispersal 
effects, due to an additional enemy on that field.  This is also the “appreciation rate” of 




i ii i tt










: This is the additional number of pests on field i killed at 
time t due to one additional enemy on that field.  
At the equilibrium, the change in pest and enemy populations is zero implying that the 
change in their shadows values is also zero.  Thus,  0
ii
Pt Nt λλ = =   











The value of one extra pest, 
i
Nt λ , is nonpositive, reflecting the value of crop damages 
inflicted by the pest, while the value of one extra natural enemy, 
i
Pt λ , is nonnegative, 
explaining the negative sign in this relationship.  The numerator on the right hand side is 
the number of pests killed by the additional enemy in each time period plus the effect that 
the  additional enemy has on the  per capita  kill rate of the other enemies.  The 



















i i ji i i ji
Nt N N Pt P P GM SM λλ + ++ +
ii
Nt Nt rλλ = −   
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tt
rN NP





: This is the net growth in time t  of the pest 
population on field i, induced by the addition of one pest on that field, excluding 
dispersal effects. 
(, ) (, )
Nij Nij
ij t t ji t t ji
N ii
tt






: This is the net movement of pests from field j to 
field i, induced by an additional pest on field i. 
(, ) (, )










: This is the net movement of enemies from field j to 
the field i due to an additional pest on field i. 
[ (,) ,] (,)
(,)
ii i ii
ii tt t tt
Pt ii i
tt t








: This is the growth of the enemy population on field 
i at time t induced by an additional pest on that field. 
Substituting the expression for 
i























The numerator of the shadow value is the value lost on field i due to pest damage.  The 
denominator is the interest rate minus the “appreciation” rate of the pest.   






Nt Pt i ii
t tt





= −− − =
∂
.   13 
Rearranging, at the margin, the grower will use an additional unit of pest control when 















The left hand side is the marginal benefit which is the decrease in pest population from an 
additional unit of pest control multiplied by the damage avoided by killing an additional 
pest.  The right hand side is the marginal cost which has two components: the direct per 
unit cost of an additional unit of pest control and the indirect cost of an additional unit of 
pest control due to the negative effect of the pesticide on the enemy population.  For the 
organic grower, an additional unit of pesticide has no direct  effect on the enemy 
population so his marginal cost only contains the direct per unit cost.   




Nt λ | is small- This implies little pest damage from an additional pest, so there is 









 is small- This implies that the pest control method is relatively ineffective 
and few pests die from an additional unit of control. 
• 
i
Pt λ is large-  This implies that enemies are effective at controlling the pest 
population, and consequently pest control that kills enemies has a higher indirect 
cost for the conventional grower.  This will lead to a lower level of the toxic pest 











 is large- This implies that many enemies die as a result of an additional 
unit of pest control.  The more toxic the pest control is for natural enemies, the 
smaller the quantity of the conventional pesticide used. 
• 
i w  is large- When an extra unit of pest control is expensive, the grower will use 
fewer units of control. 
The Socially Optimal Equilibrium 
To determine whether or not growers incur a deadweight loss when they do not 
cooperate, and to determine the distribution of the deadweight loss when it exists,  I 
examine the socially optimal pest control decisions.  This model assumes both farms use 
different management practices, but profit is maximized jointly, taking into account the 
movement of both pests and enemies across the two fields.  The total profits with the 
socially optimal levels of pest control will then be compared to the total profits with the 
privately optimal levels of pest control. 
The social planner will maximize the combined profits of both the organic and the 
conventional growers, taking into account the movement of pests and natural enemies.  




max [ (1 ( )) (1 ( )) ]
co
tt




py DN py DN wX wX dt
∞
=
− + − −− ∫  
Subject to: 
(12)  () (,) () (,) (,)
c
c cc c c c cc c oco oc co t
t t t t t t Ntt Ntt
N




= − −− +
∂
   15 
(13)  [ (,) ,]() (,) (,)
c
c c c c c c oco oc co t
t t t t t Ptt Ptt
P







(14)  () (,) () (,) (,)
o
o oo o o o oo oc co c oco t
t t t t t t Ntt Ntt
N




= − −− +
∂
 
(15)  [ (,) ,] (,) (,)
o
o o o o oc co c oco t
t t t t Ptt Ptt
P







The present-valued Hamiltonian for the social planner is: 
(16)  (1 ( )) (1 ( ))
cc c oo o c c o o
t t tt H py DN py DN wX wX = − + − −−  
  [ () (,) () (,) (,) ]
c c cc c c c cc c oco oc co
N t t t t t t t Ntt Ntt N rN P NP hX d NN d NN λφ + − −− +  
  [ [ (,) ,]() (,) (,) ]
cc c c c c c oco oc co
P t t t t t t Ptt Ptt P f NP P b X d NN d NN λφ + −− +  
  [ () (,) () (,) (,) ]
o o oo o o o oo oc co c oco
N t t t t t t t Ntt Ntt N rN P NP hX d NN d NN λφ + − −− +  
  [ [ ( , ), ] ( , ) ( , )]
oo o o o oc co c oco
P t t t t t Ptt Ptt P f NP P d NN d NN λφ + −+ . 
Under the assumptions used for the private profit maximization, a maximum will exist for 
the joint profit maximization because this Hamiltonian is the sum of the two concave 
Hamiltonians in the private profit maximization. 










































Nt GM λ + + ()
c c oc
Pt P P SM λ +  
+
o oc
Nt N M λ
o co
Pt P M λ +
cc
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c oc c oc
Nt Pt P MM λλ ++ 
( )( )
o o co o o co
Nt N N Pt P P GM SM λλ + ++ +
oo














Pt P G λ
oo
Pt Pt rλλ = −   
Rearranging (17) and (18), we find that the social planner’s decision rule for each grower 






























However, the equilibrium  shadow values in the social planner’s problem are different 
than in the privately managed case. 
Setting  0
coco






















Like in the privately optimal case, the socially optimal enemy shadow values are equal to 
the pest shadow value multiplied by the number of pests killed per time period due to an 
additional enemy.  This is due  to the assumption that enemies follow pests and their   17 
dispersal does not depend on enemy  density.  However, the pest shadow values are 
different in the social planner’s problem, making the enemy shadow values different as 
well. 
Substituting the enemy shadow values into (19) and (21) yields the following pest 
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As before, the numerator of the pest shadow value equals the value of damages caused by 
an additional pest on field i.  The value in the numerator takes into account the damages 
on  field  i  (in square brackets).  Unlike before, the value of damages  also  includes 
damages on field j caused by the additional pest on field i (not in square brackets).  The 
damages on field j include direct damages caused by pest dispersal as well as indirect 
damages due to a change in the enemy  population caused by the changing pest 
population.  The denominator is again the interest rate minus the “appreciation rate” of 
the pest except that now this rate includes both the appreciation on the field of interest (in 
square brackets) as well as the appreciation on the other field (not in square brackets). 
Comparing the Private and Social Optima 
To see how the socially optimal solution differs from the privately optimal solution and 
to determine which parameters increase or decrease this difference, we compare the pest   18 
shadow values in the two scenarios.  If the socially optimal pest shadow value exceeds 
the privately optimal pest shadow value in absolute value, the social damages of an 
additional pest exceed the private damages,  and a positive externality of pest control 
exists.  Joint profits will be higher if growers increase pest control relative to the privately 
optimal levels of control.  If the privately optimal pest shadow value exceeds the socially 
optimal pest shadow value, the social damages of an additional pest are less than the 
private damages, and a negative externality of pest control exists.   Joint profits will be 
higher if growers decrease pest control relative to the privately optimal levels of control. 
Looking at the socially optimal shadow value  for field i’s pest population, the 
parts in  square brackets are  the parts  contained in both the privately optimal shadow 
value and the socially optimal shadow value, while the parts outside of the square 
brackets are only found in the socially optimal shadow value.  All terms in the shadow 
values are evaluated at the optimal levels.  While the terms in brackets are found in both 
the privately and socially optimal shadow values, they are evaluated at different levels of 
pesticide application and pest and enemy populations.  If we assume that the damage 
function and the various functions included in the population dynamics equations are 
linear, evaluating these terms at different levels will not change their values.  Under these 
linearity assumptions, the  only difference between the privately and socially optimal 
shadow values will be the terms outside of the brackets.  We can then determine how the 
socially optimal levels of pest control compare to the non-cooperative levels by looking 
at these additional terms.  When these linearity assumptions do not hold, we may not be   19 
able to compare the cooperative and non-cooperative pest control levels without applying 
specific functional forms and parameter values to the population dynamics.    
Linearity assumptions are likely unrealistic implying that the value of the terms in 
brackets will differ when evaluated at the socially and privately optimal levels.  Provided 
the socially and privately optimal solutions do not imply large differences in pesticide, 
pest, and enemy levels, and provided the functions do not exhibit threshold effects, the 
addition of the three non-bracketed terms will outweigh differences in the values of the 
bracketed terms because the values of the bracketed terms will not change significantly.  
The discussion that follows limits attention to this case.  In other cases, the change in the 
value of the bracketed terms may reinforce the results found here or they may dampen the 
results. 
The specific functional forms of the population dynamics will affect the sign and 
magnitude of the terms found only in the socially optimal pest shadow value and will 
consequently affect  the difference between the privately and socially optimal shadow 
values.  Two aspects of the population dynamics drive the sign of the difference between 
the socially and privately optimal pest shadow values: pest dispersal and enemy kill rates.  
Pest dispersal can be one of three types. 











:  Pests move from areas with a high pest 
population to areas with a low pest population, obtaining a higher level of 
resources per pest.   20 











:  Pest movement does not depend on the pest 
population. 











:  Pests move towards areas with a high pest 
population.  This would occur if pests do better when surrounded by other 
pests. 












  which 
implies that the rate of predation or parasitism does not increase as the enemy population 
increases.  This  suggests a crowding out effect.  As a result of this relationship, the 
movement of an enemy from field i has two effects on field j..  First, it results in the loss 
of the pest mortality that that enemy would have inflicted,  (,)
ii
tt NP φ .  Second, it may 
increase the kill rates of all remaining  enemies, leading to an increase in total pest 


























, field i experiences a 















, field i  experiences a net increase in enemy-induced pest 
deaths when an enemy leaves its field. 
With these different population dynamics in mind, we will examine the three 
























,  is the direct effect felt by grower j  from an 
additional pest on grower i’s field.  The additional pest on grower i’s field induces 
movement of pests.  If pests move onto grower j’s field (pest dispersal type 1), the direct 
effect represents increased damage on farmer j’s field.  If the additional pest induces a 
movement of pests onto grower i’s field  (pest dispersal type  3), this direct effect 
represents damages avoided on field j.  If there is no density dependent movement of 
pests (pest dispersal type 2), an increase in pests on field i does not cause any direct 
damages on field j.      
Second, the “indirect effect”, 
()
()
( )( ( ))
j



















,  is the 
indirect effect felt by grower j from an additional pest on grower i’s field.  In this model, 
enemies follow the pests, so the additional pest on field i induces a shift of enemies from 















, implying  0
j
P K < , the increase in kill rate is high enough to 
offset the loss of the predation or parasitism that emigrated enemies would have caused 
on field j had they not emigrated.  If this holds, the indirect effect will represent damages 
avoided due to increased killing by natural enemies.  If the increase in kill rate does not   22 
offset the decrease due to enemy emigration, the indirect effect represents increased 
damages.  Notice that the pest dispersal type does not impact the indirect effect. 
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the appreciation rate  of field i’s additional pest that takes place on field j.  Since an 
additional pest induces movement of pests and enemies, an additional pest on field i 
changes the number of future pests on field j.  The two parenthesized terms contained in 
the numerator both contain the same population dynamics terms except the pest dispersal, 
kill rate, and enemy growth terms refer to different fields.  If  the two fields were 
identical, the numerator would be a square number, and thus, positive.  When the 
population dynamics on both fields are similar, both parentheses will have the same sign, 
making this term positive.  Since it is subtracted off of the denominator, this component 
increases the absolute value of the socially optimal pest shadow value relative to the 
privately optimal pest shadow value.  If the kill rates and enemy growth rates differ 
considerably across fields, as we might expect if conventional pesticides have sublethal 
effects on enemies, this term will be negative, lowering the absolute value of the socially 
optimal pest shadow value relative to the privately optimal pest shadow value.    
  To determine how the socially optimal pest shadow value differs from the 
privately optimal pest shadow value, all three parts must be combined.  However, in 
certain situations, they work in opposite directions.  Table 1 provides an outline of the 
results discussed below.  The middle three columns indicate which conditions must hold   23 
for each of the three dispersal types to lead to the given difference between the social and 
private damages.  A positive sign in column (A) indicates that the increase in kill rate 
induced by a reduction in enemies offsets the pest deaths the lost enemies would have 
caused, while a negative sign indicates the reverse.  A positive sign in column (B) 
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indicates the reverse.  A positive sign in column (C) indicates that the change in the 
numerator outweighs the change in the denominator, or 
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while a negative sign indicates the reverse.  In the table, all scenarios assume that both 
fields have similar population dynamics.  In the event of differing population dynamics, 
any of the following cases could result in lower social damages relative to private 
damages if the differences are dramatic enough.   
  For most scenarios involving a movement of pests from the field with a higher 
pest population to the field with the lower pest population, social damages from an 
additional pest exceed private damages, implying that it is socially optimal for both 
growers to increase their pest control.  Under this pest dispersal assumption, a grower   24 
would not unilaterally decrease pest control because doing so would cause an increase in 
the number of pests moving from his neighbor’s field onto his own.  If both growers 
agree to increase their pest control simultaneously, they will achieve a decrease in crop 
damages that more than compensates for the increase in pest control costs. 
  Under the assumption that pests move from the field with the high pest population 
to the field with the low pest population, it is also possible that the social damages are 
lower than the private damages if the indirect effect outweighs the direct effect and the 
appreciation rate effect.  This implies that when grower i keeps his pest level high and 
induces a movement of enemies from field j to field i, the kill rate on field j increases 
enough to more than compensate for the increase in pests that result from the dispersal of 
pests from field i to field j.   
  When pest dispersal does not depend on the relative levels of the pest populations 
on the two  fields, the indirect effect and appreciation rate  effect still occur because a 
change in pests induces movement of the natural enemies.  When a movement of enemies 
from field j to field i only has a small effect on the kill rate, social damages from an 
additional pest on field i exceed private damages.  If the movement of enemies from field 
j to field i has a large effect on the kill rate, private damages from an additional pest on 
field i exceed social damages since the movement of enemies away from field j increases 
the effectiveness of the remaining enemies, allowing j  to benefit from i’s  high pest 
population.   
  When pests move from the field with the low pest population to the field with the 
high pest population, social damages may be greater than or less than private damages.    25 
When the change in kill rate is small and the direct effect dominates, the social damages 
are lower than the privately optimal damages, and growers should decrease their pest 
control.  In this case, when growers act unilaterally, they use a very high level of pest 
control to prevent an influx of pests from the other field.  When growers cooperate, they 
can decrease their pest control levels without facing an increase in pests from the other 
grower’s field.  When the change in kill rate is small, and the appreciation rate effect 
dominates, social damages exceed private damages.     
  When the pest has a similar effect on conventional and organic crops and when 
natural enemies have a similar effect on pests on conventional and organic farms, the 
shadow values for the two types of growers will move in the same direction when going 
from the privately optimal equilibrium to the socially optimal equilibrium.  However, it 
may be the case that enemies have lower kill rates on conventional fields due to sublethal 
effects of conventional pesticides.  In this case, the indirect effect  contained in  the 
socially optimal organic pest shadow value will be smaller than in the socially optimal 
conventional pest shadow value; the loss of enemies from the conventional field to the 
organic field will have a minimal impact on the conventional pest population.  Similarly, 
if the organic grower plants a variety that is more pest resistant in response to not being 
able to use conventional pesticides, the damages inflicted on the organic farm from pests 
originating on the conventional farm may be small, decreasing the divergence between 
the socially and privately optimal levels of conventional pest control.   Additionally, if 
the organic crop receives a price premium, the socially optimal conventional pest shadow 
value will diverge from the privately optimal pest shadow value more than the   26 
corresponding organic divergence.  The impact of additional pests will have a larger 
monetary impact on the organic farm. 
  The socially and privately optimal levels of pest control will only coincide if there 
is no density dependent movement of pests or natural enemies.  For any other possible 
case, the two will diverge.  When maximizing joint profits, the social planner has the 
privately optimal pest control levels available as options.  When the socially optimal pest 
control levels diverge from the privately optimal levels, this must occur because these 
levels increase joint profits relative to joint profits using the privately optimal levels of 
pest control.  When both growers make changes in pest control levels  in the same 
direction and of the same magnitude, the distribution of profit gains will be similar.  
When the magnitude or direction of changes diverges, the distribution of profit gains will 
differ.  Given the form of the solutions here, these distributional effects cannot be 
analyzed.   
Adding Natural Enemy Augmentation 
While some growers may be able to establish populations of natural enemies on their 
farms  at negligible cost, others may need to create habitat or provide supplemental 
resources to attract and sustain viable enemy populations.  In cases where the farm is too 
small to sustain a population or when the regional level of enemies is too low, the grower 
may need to purchase commercially available enemies to release in the field.  This is 
known as augmentation.   
    To account for possible augmentation, the organic grower can choose the level of 
augmentation effort,  t α .  This corresponds to an increase in the enemy population equal   27 
to  () t s α .  In the case where the grower provides resources for the enemy,  () s ⋅  represents 
how this effort translates into enemies.  In the case where the grower purchases enemies 
to apply,  () s ⋅  represents how the number bought translates into effective enemies.  Some 
enemies may die in the transportation and application process, and imported enemies may 
be of lower quality than native enemies due to how they are reared in captivity and how 
they are stored and shipped (Hajek, 2004). 
    This model assumes the conventional grower will not choose augmentation both 
because conventional pesticides will kill the imported enemies, and because the use of 
augmentation will likely be more expensive than conventional methods.  This implies 
that the privately optimal conventional decisions are identical with and without organic 
grower augmentation. 
  The organic grower’s private optimization problem becomes: 
(27) 
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The present-valued Hamiltonian is: 
(30)  (1 ( ))
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Here, the organic grower will apply the organic pesticide if its marginal benefit exceeds 














and he will augment the enemy population when augmentation’s marginal benefit is at 












Rates of augmentation will be higher if the cost of augmentation is low, damages are 
high, predation or parasitism rates are high, and enemy appreciation is high.  The enemy 
appreciation rate depends in part on the region’s enemy population which is influenced 
by the movement of the enemies and the actions of the neighbor.   29 
From (34), we see that the enemy shadow value takes the same form as in the 






















This implies that: 
(39) 
oo
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Since the augmentation variable does not enter into OA.3 and OA.4 and will not enter 
into the corresponding first order conditions of the socially optimal model, the private 
and social pest shadow values retain the same form as the problem without augmentation. 
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Again, we see the socially optimal pest shadow value contains three terms not contained 
in the privately optimal pest shadow value. 
As was the case without augmentation, the decision rules governing the socially 

























have the same form as the rules governing the privately optimal levels, but these rules 
contain  the pest shadow value for the socially optimal  case which is quantitatively 
different that of the privately optimal case. 
  The socially optimal first order conditions governing the organic grower’s use 
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, ,, o Diff o SO o PO
Nt Nt Nt λ λλ = − and 
Diff SO PO β ββ = −.   31 
(45) is of the same form as the corresponding expression in the socially optimal 
case in the absence of augmentation.  Thus, the results in Table 1 also represent  the 
direction of change moving from the privately optimal to the socially optimal levels of 
organic pesticide use with augmentation, assuming the direct, indirect, and appreciation 
rate effects dominate any changes in the levels of components found in both the socially 
and privately optimal pest shadow values. 
When considering (46), it is important to remember that (,)
oo
tt NP ββ = , so the 
value of this term can be different in the socially optimal solution relative to the privately 
optimal solution.  Considering the case where the socially optimal enemy population is 
greater than the privately optimal one, we know that the marginal value of an additional 
enemy is lower at the social optimum than at the private optimum given our assumptions. 
This implies 
Diff β is negative.   
If 
Diff β   has the same sign as
Diff λ ,  augmentation use will move in the same 
direction as organic pesticide use when moving from the private optimum to the social 
optimum.  This implies that augmentation complements organic pesticides.  Intuitively, in 
this case, pesticides decrease the source of food or hosts for the enemy, which in turn will 
decrease the enemy population.  The use of augmentation provides a steady stream of 
enemies to replace those lost due to a lack of pests, and can compensate for low regional 
levels of enemies.  For the cases listed in table 1 where the social damages from an 
additional pest exceed private damages, 
Diff λ   is also negative, implying that 
augmentation and organic pesticides and augmentation are complements.  Thus, when the   32 
social damages exceed the private damages, growers increase both types of pest control 
in the cooperative case. 
For the cases listed in table 1 where social damages are less than private damages, 
Diff λ is positive  and is of the opposite sign as 
Diff β , implying that augmentation and 
organic pesticides are complements.  When moving to the social optimum, growers shift 
from one type of pest control to the other and decrease the levels of both types of pest 
control. 
Conclusions 
The results of this theoretical model show that under most circumstances, growers will 
affect other growers in their region through their pest management decisions.  In regions 
where growers are homogenous, the impacts on one another will be similar.  In regions 
containing crop-pest-enemy systems where pests move from areas of high pest density to 
areas of low pest density, a positive externality of pest control will likely exist.  In those 
areas where enemies have much higher kill rates at low levels of the enemy population, a 
negative externality of pest control will likely exist. 
In  regions where growers are heterogeneous, such as agricultural regions 
containing both organic and conventional growers, the impacts are likely to  be 
asymmetric, although the degree of asymmetry will depend on the specific crop-pest-
enemy system.  Those systems in which conventional growers use pesticides with 
significant sublethal effects on enemies will contain large asymmetries because enemies 
will have very low kill rates on conventional fields relative to their kill rates on organic 
fields.  Similarly, large asymmetries will exist for crops where the organic product   33 
receives a high price premium over the conventional product.  The damages inflicted on 
organic fields induced by an additional pest located on the conventional field will be 
more highly valued than similar damages inflicted on the conventional field.   
Analysis of specific crop-pest-enemy systems can illuminate ways by which 
specific types of growers impact each other so that these impacts can be addressed.  Such 
internalization of externalities may be addressed by pest management districts, a 
phenomenon that has appeared to combat pests, such as the olive fruit fly  and 
mosquitoes, where cooperation of all stakeholders is crucial for control.     
  The current model illustrates how asymmetries between population dynamics on 
different fields can result in different adjustment to the social optimum for different 
growers.  It shows how sublethal effects of synthetic broad spectrum pesticides can result 
in the conventional grower adjusting his pest control more than the organic grower.  It 
cannot, however, adequately address all issues regarding toxicity because the modeled 
conventional grower only has one pesticide available, making an analytical solution 
possible.  Future work will simulate scenarios where the conventional grower has 
pesticides of varying toxicities available at varying prices and with varying efficacies to 
determine how the socially optimal level and type of pest control differ from the privately 
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Table 1.  Social Versus Private Damages Resulting from an Additional Pest on Field 
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1 Sublethal effects include reductions in reproduction rates and lifespans, interference 
with the enemies’ ability to locate prey or hosts, and suppression of  predators’ appetites.  
All of these sublethal effects decrease the natural enemies’ supply of pest control 
(Dresneux et al, 2007). 
 
2 By reducing the problem to only one pesticide option per grower, the model assumes 
that the grower has chosen the most profitable form of pest control and now must choose 
the level to apply.  Implicitly, the grower’s application level does not alter the relative 
profitability of his chosen pest control method. 
3 The Hamiltonian may still be jointly concave if some of these assumptions are relaxed 
as long as the relative magnitudes of its components still ensure negative 
semidefiniteness of the Hessian matrix. 
 
4  This  shadow value  and the shadow value that will be derived for the local pest 
population closely mirror the shadow value one finds in a traditional capital investment 
problem.  In this kind of problem, if profit can be written as  () K π , if capital appreciates 
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